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 The Objectivity of Accountants’ Judgments: A Replication and Extension 
 
ABSTRACT: This study examines accountants’ objectivity in estimating the value of an account. Its 
purpose is to determine whether professional objectivity, in generating a fair and unbiased accounting 
estimate, will be influenced by a possible conflict of interest. Students, proxying as accountants, 
completed an experiment to test the impact of two factors that could create a conflict of interest: a client’s 
legal position and fee structure of the engagement. We hypothesize that accountants will be influenced by 
their client’s legal position when providing estimates, and will be even more influenced when there is the 
possibility of being paid a fee contingent on the estimate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ponemon (1995) and Haynes et al. (1998) provide empirical evidence that suggests when client 
interests are explicitly made known to accountants, the accountants sometimes lose their objectivity and, 
in fact, act as client advocates. The current study utilizes the research instrument developed by Ponemon 
(1995) and expands on his work by addressing an important and little researched area – whether 
accounting services performed for contingent fees will induce an even greater loss of objectivity. 
 To further explain, a discussion of the scenario developed by Ponemon follows. Suppose a fire 
destroys a wholesaler’s merchandise inventory and the company and its insurance carrier are in a legal 
dispute over the inventory loss. According to the wholesaler, the insurance carrier refuses to pay a fair 
value for the lost inventory so the wholesaler takes the insurance provider to court. Each side hires an 
accountant to provide an estimate of as to the fair value of the lost inventory. Intuitively, higher damages 
estimates are more favorable to the company in terms of insurance recovery while a lower estimate of the 
inventory loss would be more beneficial to the insurance carrier. Using this scenario, Ponemon found that 
contrary to the appearance of accountants taking an objective position, the accountants hired by the 
company made, on average, significantly larger inventory damage estimates than the other accountants. 
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Similarly, the accountants hired by the insurance carrier made, on average, significantly smaller damage 
estimates than the other accountants. 
 The validity of experimental research results in most areas of academia (e.g., medicine, 
psychology) is dependent on similar findings from multiple replications. However, replication is generally 
not a common practice in the accounting discipline. In accounting, replications of studies are rarely 
published because they are not thought to contribute substantially to the body of knowledge that has 
already been generated. When a replication does occur, it is usually due to a significant change within the 
field that could skew results, or may include an extension that would slightly alter the expected outcome. 
The present study replicates Ponemon’s work and adds another independent variable, the presence of a 
contingency fee as explained below, to his original model. 
While auditors cannot perform attestation services (e.g., audit or review) under a contingency fee 
arrangement, contingency fees can be used in many accounting services. Utilizing the Ponemon scenario 
as a basis, we manipulate the payment arrangement by comparing fixed fees to contingency fees. With the 
fixed fee contract, the accountant is paid a lump sum for representing (providing a damage estimate for) 
his or her client. With the contingent fee arrangement, the accountant’s fee is determined by the outcome 
of the case. The accountant for the plaintiff (the wholesaler) would receive a larger fee if the settled 
damage estimate is high, and a lower fee if the settled damage estimate is low. The insurer’s accountant 
would receive a percentage of cost savings; the more the insurance company saves (i.e., the less it has to 
pay the wholesaler), the greater the accountant’s fee. 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Objectivity 
 According to professional standards set by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), objectivity is essential when performing accounting and auditing functions. In this context, 
objectivity is defined as a mental attitude that permits the individual accountant or auditor to fulfill 
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professional responsibilities without compromising judgment or ethical beliefs or yielding to the demands 
of others within and outside the organizations. The AICPA’s Rules of Professional Conduct specifically 
address independence, integrity, and objectivity. Rule 101 states “A member in public practice shall be 
independent in the performance of professional services,” and Rule 102 states “In performing any 
professional service, a member shall maintain objectivity and integrity, shall be free of conflicts of 
interest, and shall not knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to others.” 
Research on accountant’s objectivity has largely focused on the independence of auditors, but the 
results can largely be generalized to other accounting services. A key element in the literature on auditor’s 
objectivity deals with the potential economic bonding between the auditor and the client. For example, 
Bazerman et al. (2002) suggests that motivational and cognitive biases can adversely affect auditors’ 
judgments and impair independence. In a summarization of experiments on auditor independence, Church 
et al. (2015, 220) states that “much evidence suggests that auditors tend to evaluate client-provided 
information in a manner that suggest they are biased to ‘approve’ or ‘confirm’ the information. In 
addition, auditors tend to evaluate evidence in a manner that supports client preferences when accounting 
standards are ambiguous” (emphasis added).  
Another aspect to be taken into consideration is that the impairment of objectivity may not always 
affect an accountant’s work negatively. Taylor et al. (2003) emphasize that in order to understand the role 
of objectivity for auditors “it is critical to acknowledge that absolute objectivity is not possible in a 
judgment-based profession,” and that it is unreasonable to expect auditors to have no concern in their 
client’s interest at all. In fact, it is possible to perform auditing or accounting services reliably and 
appropriately without being fully independent, but sufficiently objective. 
Contingency fees  
 Little research has been conducted on providing accounting services under a contingency fee 
arrangement, despite its growth in practice (Kroll 2013). A contingent fee is a fee arrangement in which 
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the total fee paid by a client is dependent on the attainment of a specific outcome (Pitkin 2015). For 
example, contingent fee arrangements are used by some accountants to “audit” overpayments to vendors. 
The accountant is hired by a company to examine its payment processes. If a duplicate payment is made, 
or if a discount is taken incorrectly–such as a 2% discount taken even if the payment is made beyond the 
normal 10 day window, then an overpayment occurs. The accountant earns a percentage of any refund 
received by the company from a vendor that was overpaid (e.g., the company receives, say, 85% of the 
overpayment, and 15% goes to the accountant). If no overpayments are returned to the company, the 
accountant receives no fee. 
Proponents of contingency fee arrangements argue that the fee structure is beneficial to both the 
client (e.g., the company whose payables are being scrutinized) and the accountant. The company has 
nothing to lose. If no overpayments are found, nothing is paid to the accountant; if overpayments are 
discovered, then the company collects refunds it otherwise would not have received. The accountant 
benefits by having the potential to earn large fees, offset by resources spent on the service and possible 
losses when there are no findings (i.e., no overpayments). 
Others view contingent fees critically and argue that they should be prohibited beyond their 
current constraints (e.g., performing an engagement on a contingency fee basis for an audit client creates 
a self-interest threat in that it puts the firm in a position of wanting the same outcome as the client, and 
thus contingent fees are not permissible for audits or any services provided to audit clients). Two primary 
arguments against the use of contingent fees for accounting services are that contingent fees create an 
incentive for the accountant to interpret standards in a manner that favors a certain client position, and the 
fee arrangement can result in auditors earning very large fees that might be out of proportion to the 
amount of time and expense expended by the auditor (AICPA 2015). 
Despite the criticisms of contingent fees, they are allowed for some services per the AICPA’s 
Code of Professional Conduct which states that “A member in public practice shall not (1) Perform for a 
contingent fee any professional services for, or receive such a fee from a client for whom the member or 
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the member's firm performs, (a) an audit or review of a financial statement; or (b) a compilation of a 
financial statement when the member expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use the 
financial statement and the member's compilation report does not disclose a lack of independence; or (c) 
an examination of prospective financial information; or (2) Prepare an original or amended tax return or 
claim for a tax refund for a contingent fee for any client.” 
The proposed study would be the first in the accounting literature, that we are aware of, to 
empirically test the impact of contingency fee arrangements on accountants’ behavior. 
Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis (H1) of this study predicts similar results to those found by Ponemon; with a 
standard, fixed fee arrangement, damage estimates from the defendant’s accountant are most conservative 
(lowest), while estimates are most liberal (highest) from the plaintiff’s accountant. The estimate of the 
control group, representing the court (C), should fall in between. Notationally, H1 can be stated as:  
H1: 
L D < L C < L P 
where 
L  is the estimated loss from the fire, D is the defendant’s accountant (hired by the insurance 
company), C is the control group, and P is the plaintiff’s accountant (hired by the wholesaler that incurred 
damages in the fire). 
 The second hypothesis (H2) predicts that contingent fees (CF) will result in more extreme 
estimates for the parties in litigation. The higher the potential is for greater payoff, the less objective the 
accountants’ estimates will be. Notationally, H2 is shown as: 
H2:  
L DCF < L DFF < [ L CFF < L PFF < L PCF 
where 
L , D, C, and P are previously defined, CF is contingent fee, and FF is fixed fee. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Experimental Methods 
 A 2x2 between-subjects design is used to compare the responses of the participants under two 
manipulations: (1) whether the accountants are paid under a fixed fee or contingency fee arrangement, 
and (2) whether they are hired by the plaintiff (wholesaler) or defendant (insurance company). 
Subjects completed an experimental task based on the computation of a physical inventory that 
was destroyed in a warehouse fire by using the gross profit method. The experimental materials included 
the description of the inventory, background on the damages incurred, and the nature of the litigation. The 
experimental materials can be found in appendix A. 
The case scenario provided to the participants was a replication of Ponemon’s original study, 
modified by changing the names and dates in the instrument, and adding an independent variable, fee 
structure. According to Ponemon, he chose the task for two primary reasons. First, the computation of 
damages is relatively easy to complete and does not require the participants to have any experience. 
Second, the historic gross profit percentages used in the computation of inventory varies during the 
relevant period of analysis, giving participants considerable flexibility in estimating damages. We chose 
to use Ponemon’s study because it involves a task conducive testing fee structure (fixed or contingent) 
with little change to the instrument. 
The following scenario was given to all participants to provide the background information of the 
experiment. 
“On April 3, 2015 a fire destroyed the entire merchandise inventory on hand of Lenoir 
Wholesalers and Distributors, Inc. (LWD), a distributor of truck accessories and farm equipment. The 
company is a medium-sized business located in Charlotte, North Carolina with one primary warehouse 
location, and sells to truck and tractor dealerships throughout North America. 
LWD's physical inventory, valued on an average cost basis, is fully insured by a policy based on 
the asset valuation or cost at the time of the fire. LWD did track quantities on-hand and kept 
perpetual records for its inventory assets, however, the computer system was not properly backed up and 
all inventory records were lost in the fire. Fortunately, LWD's controller was able to provide financial 
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information for computing damages using the gross profit method to value the inventory loss. The gross 
profit method takes the retail value of the inventory and deducts an average gross profit percentage to 
determine the inventory's approximate cost.” 
In addition, subjects were given the quantitative data shown in figure 1 for purposes of computing 
accounting damages. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 Each experimental instrument contained (1) the background description of the problem and 
quantitative data, (2) one of four experimental treatments (or a control group) concerning the legal 
position of the client who hired the accountant (plaintiff or defendant) and the manner in which fees are 
paid (fixed or contingent), (3) a brief schema that illustrated how to computed a missing inventory value 
using the gross profit method, and (4) a debriefing questionnaire used for manipulation checks and 
collecting demographic information. 
Participants 
Undergraduate and graduate student participants, proxying as practicing accountants, were 
selected based on their enrollment in accounting classes in which the experimental topic (inventory 
valuation) was similar to the material learned in class. Students were given an experiment dealing with 
the calculation and estimation of an organization’s physical inventory loss using the gross profit method. 
In total, 222 subjects participated in this study with 119 individuals providing usable responses. Fifty-nine 
responses were eliminated due to incomplete data and 44 were eliminated because their responses were 
nonsensical based on the quantitative data given or the participants failed a manipulation check. 
Treatments and Dependent Variable 
 Individuals were randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or a control group. The 
control group was told that they represented a neutral third party (the court) and were paid a standard, 
fixed fee. The first and second treatment groups were told that they represented Lenoir Wholesalers and 
Distributors, Inc. (the plaintiff) who sued its insurance company for the fair value of insured inventory 
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assets. The third and fourth treatment groups were told that they represented the insurance company (the 
defendant) in determining the fair value of LWD’s lost inventory. The first and third groups were told that 
they would be paid a standard, fixed fee while the second and fourth groups were told they would be paid 
a percentage of the amount of their estimate, based on the amount they saved their client (change this to 
be consistent with new instrument). The experimental treatments received by subjects were stated as 
follows.  
Plaintiff with fixed fee: “The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement 
amount determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance 
company for breach of contract. You have been hired by LWD as an accounting expert to provide an 
estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to attest to 
this value in court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee.” 
Plaintiff with contingent fee: “The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the 
settlement amount determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the 
insurance company for breach of contract. You have been hired by LWD as an accounting expert to 
provide an estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to 
attest to this value in court. For this service, you will be paid a percentage of LWD’s damage estimate 
[e.g., the higher the amount of the estimate, the higher the fee].” 
Defendant with fixed fee: “The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement 
amount determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance 
company for breach of contract. You have been hired by the insurance company as an accounting expert 
to provide an estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to 
attest to this value court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee.” 
Defendant with contingent fee: “The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the 
settlement amount determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the 
insurance company for breach of contract. You have been hired by the insurance company as an 
accounting expert to provide an estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on 
April 3, 2015, and to attest to this value in court. For this service, you will be paid a percentage of the 
insurance company’s savings estimate [e.g., the lower the amount of the estimate, the higher the fee].” 
The remaining subjects were randomly assigned to a control group where experimental materials 
stated that the accountant is appointed by the court. The responses for individuals in this group should not 
be influenced by client advocacy considerations. All members of the control group received the following 
information. 
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Control: “The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been appointed by the court as an accounting expert to provide an 
estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to attest to this 
value in court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee.” 
 After reading the treatment, individuals were asked to compile the value of missing inventory, 
which served as the dependent variable of the study, using the quantitative data provided by employing 
the following formulation: Missing Inventory = Beginning Inventory + Purchases - Cost of Goods Sold, 
where Cost of Goods Sold = [(1 - Gross Profit Percent) x Gross Sales]. After estimating LWD’s inventory 
value, individuals were asked to express their confidence in their estimate using a 100 point continuous 
scale from “0” denoting no confidence to “100” denoting complete confidence. 
 The reliability of responses was determined by matching the estimated value of inventory to the 
range of possible values that could be obtained from the quantitative data provided, from $3,008,356 to 
$10,743,403, depending on the gross profit percentage used.  
RESULTS 
 The evaluation of the dependent variable (inventory valuation) and descriptive statistics of 
inventory estimates are provided in table 1. According to H1, the accountants are expected to provide a 
lower inventory value when they are hired by the defendant (insurance company) and a higher inventory 
value when they are hired by the plaintiff (LWD). According to H2, the accountants are expected to 
provide an even lower inventory value when hired by the defendant (insurance company) and an even 
higher inventory value when they are hired by the plaintiff (LWD) when they are paid a contingency fee 
based on their performance. The inventory estimates provided by the accountants in the control group are 
used as a benchmark for objective estimation. 
 As shown in the ANOVA results in Table 1, panel A, the independent variable that captures 
differences in who hired the accountant (Client) is not statistically significant. While the data does not 
support H1, the mean inventory valuation estimates (shown in Panel B of Table 1) are supported 
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directionally. The mean inventory value is higher for LWD (~$6,294,000) than it is for the insurance 
company (~$6,244,000) under both fee structures. However, contrary to what we expected, the mean 
inventory valuation for the control group (~$5,747,000) does not lie between the mean inventory 
valuations of the plaintiff (LWD) and defendant (insurance company).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Contrary to our expectations in H2, the independent variable Fee, which tests for difference 
between fixed and contingent fee structures, is also not significant. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, 
average inventory estimates for the plaintiff (LWD) were higher under a contingency fee arrangement 
($6,467,335) than under a fixed fee arrangement ($6,154,771). In addition, average inventory estimates 
for the defendant (insurance company) were lower under the contingent fee condition ($6,058,601) than 
under the fixed fee arrangement ($6,453,701). Thus, while not supported statistically, the means follow 
the direction of H2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
We also tested the potential impact of the demographic information we collected (e.g., age, work 
experience, and student level [graduate or undergraduate]) on the participant’s inventory estimates. Each 
item was run in the ANOVA model as a covariate but none were statistically significant. 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 Although the results of this study do not support the hypotheses we developed based on 
Ponemon’s (1995) findings, there is a positive aspect involved. For the most part, our results find the 
participants to be objective. Several participants commented that they took fairness into consideration 
when choosing the gross profit percentage with which they calculated their inventory valuation. 
Considering all of the participants are accounting students rather than practicing accountants that likely 
have received ethics training and exposure to the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct, the results 
could be viewed as an optimistic outlook for the future of the industry.  
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The major limitation of our study is that students may not have understood the experimental task 
used to compute the missing inventory. This is evidenced by the large variances in the estimates of the 
inventory valuation and the large number of nonsensical answers provided by the participants (and that 
were excluded from our data analysis).  
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FIGURE 1 
Quantitative data used in accounting computations 
 
Gross Sales 01/11/15 to 04/03/15     $55,250,341 
Physical Inventory on 01/01/15      $10,001,050 
Freight-In 01/11/15 to 04/03/15     $974,010 
Merchandise purchases 01/11/15 to 04/03/15      
(including 2,432,010 of goods in transit on 04/03/15, 
shipped f.o.b. shipping point from the vendor)    $37,792,093 
Purchase returns       $1,889,032 
Month *Gross Profit %  Month *Gross Profit % 
04/2014 33%  10/2014 35% 
05/2014 32%  11/2014 39% 
06/2014 31%  12/2014 38% 
07/2014 31%  01/2015 29% 
08/2014 31%  02/2015 27% 
09/2014 32%  03/2015 26% 
 
Average gross profit for first quarter, 2014 = 35.2% 
Average gross profit for calendar year, 2014 = 34.0% 
Average gross profit for first quarter, 2015 = 27.3% 
Average gross profit for above 12 months = 32.0% 
Industry gross profit for calendar year 2014 = 25.0% 
 
*The gross profit percentage equals the gross margin divided by total sales in a given monthly time period. 
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FIGURE 2 
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TABLE 1 
Evaluation of Dependent Variable (Inventory Valuation) 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Results 
Independent Degrees of  
Variables  Freedom F-ratio p-value 
Intercept 1 933.466 .000 
Client 2 0.576 .564 
Fee 1 0.009 .926 
Client x Fee 1 0.645 .423 
 
Error 114  
 
Total 119  
 
R2=.016 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics (in thousands) 
 FEE  Client 
(both fees types) CLIENT Fixed Contingent  
 
LWD 
Mean     $6,155 
Std. Dev.  $2,177 
Minimum   $3,278 
Maximum  $10,223 
Mean     $6,467 
Std. Dev.  $1,801 
Minimum   $4,086 
Maximum  $9,860 
 Mean     $6,294 
Std. Dev.  $2,002 
Minimum   $3,278 
Maximum  $10,223 
 
INS 
Mean     $6,454 
Std. Dev.  $2,248 
Minimum   $3,561 
Maximum  $10,362 
Mean     $6,059 
Std. Dev.  $2,379 
Minimum   $3,008 
Maximum $10,223 
 Mean     $6,244 
Std. Dev.  $2,302 
Minimum   $3,008 
Maximum $10,362 
     
    CRT 
(control group) 
   
 
Mean     $5,747 
Std. Dev.  $1,941 
Minimum   $3,561 
Maximum  $10,413 
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APPENDIX A 
The following contains the full experimental materials that were given to participants in this study. 
 
Page 1 
After reading the information on the next few pages, you will be asked to make a decision based 
on that information. You may want to have a calculator and scratch paper on hand to help you formulate 
your decision. You may go back to the preceding pages to help you recall information if you wish to view 
it again. 
 
Page 2 
On April 3, 2015 a fire destroyed the entire merchandise inventory on hand of Lenoir 
Wholesalers and Distributors, Inc. (LWD), a distributor of truck accessories and farm equipment. The 
company is a medium-sized business located in Charlotte, North Carolina with one primary warehouse 
location, and sells to truck and tractor dealerships throughout North America. 
LWD's physical inventory, valued on an average cost basis, is fully insured by a policy based on 
the asset valuation or cost at the time of the fire. LWD did track quantities on-hand and kept 
perpetual records for its inventory assets, however, the computer system was not properly backed up and 
all inventory records were lost in the fire. Fortunately, LWD's controller was able to provide financial 
information for computing damages using the gross profit method to value the inventory loss. The gross 
profit method takes the retail value of the inventory and deducts an average gross profit percentage to 
determine the inventory's approximate cost. 
 
The third page was randomized among the four possible experimental treatments or the control 
group (pages 3a-3e). One of the following was given to each participant. 
Page 3a: The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been hired by LWD as an accounting expert to provide an estimated 
valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to attest to this value 
in court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee.” 
Page 3b: The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been hired by LWD as an accounting expert to provide an estimated 
valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to attest to this value in 
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court. For this service, you will be paid a percentage of LWD’s damage estimate [e.g., the higher the 
amount of the estimate, the higher the fee]. 
Page 3c: The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been hired by the insurance company as an accounting expert to 
provide an estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to 
attest to this value court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee. 
Page 3d: The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been hired by the insurance company as an accounting expert to 
provide an estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to 
attest to this value in court. For this service, you will be paid a percentage of the insurance company’s 
savings estimate [e.g., the lower the amount of the estimate, the higher the fee]. 
Page 3e: The insurance company and LWD management disagree about the settlement amount 
determined by the insurer's claims adjustment department. As a result, LWD sued the insurance company 
for breach of contract. You have been appointed by the court as an accounting expert to provide an 
estimated valuation of LWD's merchandise inventory lost in the fire on April 3, 2015, and to attest to this 
value in court. For this service, you will be paid a standard, fixed fee. 
 
Page 4 
The information provided by the controller (below) includes changes to LWD's gross profit based on 
normal seasonal variation, especially during the fall season, and the presence of significant competition 
from a large Korean firm who entered the U.S. and Canadian markets during the first quarter of 2015. 
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Compile the value of missing inventory by employing the following simple formulation:  
Missing Inventory = Beginning Inventory + Purchases - Cost of Goods Sold, 
where Cost of Goods Sold = [(1 - Gross Profit Percent) x Gross Sales]. 
 
Page 5 
Express confidence in the accounting estimate you provided using a 100 point continuous scale from "0" 
denoting no confidence to "100" denoting complete confidence.  
 
Page 6 
Who hired you to develop an estimate of the inventory loss? 
o LWD 
o Insurance Company 
o Court 
 
Gross Sales 01/11/15 to 04/03/15     $55,250,341 
Physical Inventory on 01/01/15      $10,001,050 
Freight-In 01/11/15 to 04/03/15     $974,010 
Merchandise purchases 01/11/15 to 04/03/15      
(including 2,432,010 of goods in transit on 04/03/15, 
shipped f.o.b. shipping point from the vendor)    $37,792,093 
Purchase returns       $1,889,032 
Month *Gross Profit %  Month *Gross Profit % 
04/2014 33%  10/2014 35% 
05/2014 32%  11/2014 39% 
06/2014 31%  12/2014 38% 
07/2014 31%  01/2015 29% 
08/2014 31%  02/2015 27% 
09/2014 32%  03/2015 26% 
 
Average gross profit for first quarter, 2014 = 35.2% 
Average gross profit for calendar year, 2014 = 34.0% 
Average gross profit for first quarter, 2015 = 27.3% 
Average gross profit for above 12 months = 32.0% 
Industry gross profit for calendar year 2014 = 25.0% 
 
*The gross profit percentage equals the gross margin divided by total sales in a given monthly time period. 
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How is the fee for your estimate determined? 
o Contingent fee based on outcome 
o Standard, fixed fee 
 
If participants selected that their fee was contingent on the outcome, they were asked one 
additional question. 
Page 6a: How much was your decision influenced by the party paying your fee? 
1=No influence, 7=Greatly influenced 
 
Page 7 
What factor(s) most influenced your estimate of the amount of inventory loss? 
 
Page 8 
What is your gender? 
o Male 
o Female 
 
Are you enrolled as a graduate student or undergraduate student? 
o Graduate student 
o Undergraduate student 
 
How many years of full-time work experience do you have? 
How many years of full-time accounting or finance work experience do you have? 
